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SYMPOSIUM COMMENTS
FOUR REASONS AND A PARADOX: THE MANIFEST
SUPERIORITY OF COPYRIGHT OVER SUI GENERIS
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Jane C. Ginsburg*
The "Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams"' offers an extensive and challenging critique of current intellec-
tual property protection of software. The authors argue strongly that the
law should focus on the value of the know-how embodied in programs
and the importance of protecting it, rather than on the particular means
which might be used to appropriate it.2 The authors seek to compel
reconceptualization of the place of computer programs, and of software
authors' creativity, within the domain of intellectual property. However,
their brief for change manifests several flaws. Paradoxically, it comes at
once both too soon and too late. In addition, its expectation for the
adoption of its proposed alternatives is too optimistic, while its percep-
tion of the ability of copyright law to afford appropriate protection for
computer programs is too pessimistic.
The Manifesto's objectives and the moment chosen for their declara-
tion are perplexing, if not quixotic. As the authors on several occasions
acknowledge,3 the computer software industry is currently thriving.
Moreover, copyright protection for computer programs has now become
the worldwide norm. Not only the U.S., but the E.C. and all members of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have determined to protect
computer programs as literary works, within the meaning of the domi-
nant international copyright convention.4 Even supposing that a specter
of over- and underprotection haunts the software industry, the alternative
intellectual property regimes the authors evoke are likely neither to
achieve domestic enactment, nor to secure broad and effective interna-
tional agreement. Finally, the Manifesto's essential premise, that copy-
right law ill befits computer programs because the law does not protect
works that "behave," betrays too cramped an appreciation of the subject
matter and scope of copyright protection. Copyright does, to some ex-
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law.
1. Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308 (1994) [hereinafter Manifesto].
2. See id. at 2333-42.
3. See id. at 2376, 2378.
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including




tent, protect "behavior," whether of computer programs or of other
works of authorship. The primary problem is to delineate how much "be-
havior" copyright will cover; but that problem haunts all of copyright. If
the specter the Manifesto summons is not entirely spurious, neither is it
purely computer-specific.
I. THE MAMTOE7'S TIMING: Too SOON TO TELL
AND Too LATE TO SWITCH
A. Too Soon
The authors proffer no evidence that copyright protection of com-
puter programs is currently chilling software development. On the con-
trary, the Manifesto recognizes the industry's continued vitality. However,
posit the authors, recent restrictive trends in the courts, as well as antici-
pated technological developments in reverse engineering, portend ill for
future program innovation.5 Both these propositions are problematic.
First, if the judicial pendulum seemed at first to swing toward sweeping
protection of even the most abstract elements of computer programs,
6
and then toward stingy protection of only the program's literal text,7
courts now appear to be drawing a more moderate arc. For example, all
Circuits that have addressed the question agree that, in principle, copy-
right protects not only literal code, but also nonliteral elements of a pro-
gram, such as its structure, sequence and organization.8 Courts disagree
over the level of abstraction at which the program will be protected, as
well as over the identification of the "expression" that may be protected
without risk of monopolizing the "idea" or "process" underlying the pro-
gram.9 But this disagreement is hardly peculiar to computer programs.
It exists in judicial analyses, for example, of nonfiction literary works, 10
5. See, e.g., Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2341-42, 2357-61.
6. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
7. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 35 F.3d 1435
(9th Cir. 1994).
8. See, e.g., Engineering Dynamics Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335,
1342-46 (5th Cir. 1994); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir.
1993); Altai, 982 F.2d at 701, 706-10; Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237-40, 1242-43.
9. Compare Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Ser'., Inc., 807
F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986) (structure of cotton commodities sales program held
necessary to the idea of such a program) with Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237-40 ("structure,
sequence and organization" of program for business management of a dental laboratory
held protectable "expression").
10. Compare Wainwright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978) ("[Tlhe essence of infringement lies not in
taking a general theme or in coverage of the reports as events, but in appropriating the
'particular expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and
characterization.'") with Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (holding that interpretations of historical events are not
copyrightable as a matter of law).
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and of plays."1 As Learned Hand warned, "Nobody has ever been able to
fix that boundary [between 'ideas' and 'expression'] and nobody ever
can."
12
There is a danger, but not only with respect to computer programs,
that courts, in seeking to distinguish the public domain "idea" from the
protected "expression," will so "dissect" the work as to classify all its ele-
ments as unprotectable. Indeed, the Second Circuit did so flay the ex-
pression of a computer program operating system in Computer Associates v.
Altai. 3 But other courts, including those deciding cases concerning com-
puter programs, have recognized that zeal to eliminate unprotectable ele-
ments may blind the court to the expressiveness of their ensemble.
14
Thus the Tenth Circuit, while endorsing the "abstraction-filtration-com-
parison" test announced in Altai, added this important gloss:
We suggest that a court will often be assisted in determining the
factual issue of copying if both programs are first compared in
their entirety without filtering out the unprotected elements....
[A] n initial holistic comparison may reveal a pattern of copying
that is not obvious when only certain components are
examined. 15
The Fifth Circuit has followed the Tenth in effecting an overall compari-
son of the works at issue: "The ultimate focus... should be on the input
formats and output reports taken as a whole."' 6 If courts continue to
keep sight of the work as a whole, the fear of underprotection may
dissipate.
Second, and especially poignant in light of the judicial developments
just evoked, it is hazardous to devise a new "market-oriented" intellectual
property regime to respond to conditions yet to be created. The "mar-
ket" foreseen by the lawmaker today may be quite different from the mar-
ket that actually appears tomorrow.11 The "orientation" sought might
11. Compare Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (general plots and story patterns are in the public domain)
with Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding the
defendant's film infringed copyright because it drew on more than just general patterns of
earlier work, and borrowed its expression).
12. NAichos, 45 F.2d at 121.
13. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit has applied the same technique
to disqualify much of a historical novel from copyright protection. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d
at 974-80.
14. This is particularly true when the creativity lies in the arrangement of the work's
components rather than their content This problem also exists in the context of more
traditional works of authorship. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
720 F.2d 231, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1983) (comparing the total perception of a new television
superhero and Superman).
15. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 841 (10th Cir. 1993).
16. Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th
Cir. 1994).
17. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) (extensive and detailed disposition concerning
compulsory licensing of television programs for cable distribution). Many of the economic
assumptions underlying the drafting of this provision in the mid-1970s were already out-of-
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then prove to have gone astray. Moreover, as Part II will develop, it may
well be more difficult to enact a "market-oriented" noncopyright regime
in the U.S., than to continue the work ofjudicial adaptation of copyright
principles to software. As a general proposition, courts and copyright
counselors may be more at ease applying known principles and analyses
to new subject matter, than interpreting a new text that purports to pre-
sent a new and particular approach.' 8
B. Too Late
Copyright protection of computer programs is not simply compati-
ble with software creators' needs; it has become the international intellec-
tual property norm. Since the U.S. confirmed the copyrightability of
computer programs in 1980,19 many Western European countries have
amended their copyright laws to provide explicitly for computer program
protection. 20 This process in Western Europe culminated in the adop-
tion of the 1991 European Community Directive on the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs.21 Most significantly, as of April 1994, the 105
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT') have
committed, as a matter of international trade policy, to the protection of
computer programs by copyright law. Under article 10 of the Agreement
date by the time the law became effective in 1978. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen et al.,
Copyright Liability for Gable Television: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem,
21 J.L. & Econ. 67 (1978); see also Nathan Rosenberg, Exploring the Black Box (1994)
(discussing difficulty of forecasting exploitations of new technologies). Professor Kenneth
W. Dam has criticized proposals for sui generis protection of software for similar reasons.
Looking to the experience under the 1984 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, Prof. Dam
argues that "technology outpaced the Congress .... '[S]ome of the basic definitions [of the
Act] are already obsolete, leaving important parts of mask works technology outside the
protection of that legislation.' ... [T]he usefulness of sui generis legislation in an industry
characterized by rapid technological change is called into question by the experience
under the 1984 Act." Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual
Property Protection of Software 67 (Chicago Law & Economics Working Paper No. 26, 2d
series 1994).
18. See Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting
Computer Software, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1131 (1986).
19. See Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 38, sec. 211, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)) (adding a definition of
computer program to § 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act, and a new § 117 on the rights of
owners of copies of computer programs).
20. See, e.g., Copyright Statute, J.O., No. 85-660, July 4, 1985 (France);
Administration of Copyright BGBI, No. 58, 1985 (Germany); Copyright Statute, B.O.E.,
No. 27, Nov. 17, 1987 (Spain).
21. See Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991, 1991 OJ. (L 122) 42. For
commentary on the E.C. software directive, see, e.g., Thomas Dreier, The Council
Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 13 Eur. Intell.
Prop. Rev. 319 (1991); J~rfme Huet &Jane C. Ginsburg, Computer Programs in Europe:
A Comparative Analysis of the 1991 EC Software Directive, 30 Colum.J. Transnat'l L. 327
(1992); Alan K. Palmer & Thomas C. Vinje, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection of
Computer Software: New Law Governing Software Development, 2 DukeJ. Comp. & Int'l
L. 65 (1992).
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on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs),22 GATT mem-
bers recognize that computer programs are literary works within the
meaning of the Berne Convention (the leading multilateral copyright
treaty), and undertake to protect them accordingly. The GATr/TRIPs
accord was reached following years of intense multilateral negotiations;
23
it seems most unlikely that, having at last secured agreement on copyright
as the international norm, GAT'E members will soon substitute a different
protective regime.
Moreover, there is no ready alternative to copyright as provided in
GATT/TRIPs. The Manifesto optimistically suggests that article 10bis of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property could pro-
vide effective international protection against "cloning."2 4 This is doubt-
ful. To be sure, article 10bis includes a general obligation to member
countries "to assure to nationals of... [Union] countries effective protec-
tion against unfair competition."25 However, this provision has not af-
forded a meaningful guarantee, for the treaty's definition of unfair com-
petition leaves too much room for inconsistent and uncertain
application.
The text prohibits "[a] ny act of competition contrary to honest prac-
tices in industrial or commercial matters."26 The two key terms are "act
of competition" and "contrary to honest practices." These terms, how-
ever, refer to different legal regimes. According to a leading commentary
on the treaty, the national law of each member country will determine
what acts constitute "acts of competition," while international trade
norms will determine the meaning of "honest practices."
2 7
22. GATT/TRIPs, supra note 4, 33 I.L.M. at 87.
23. On the issues and process leading to adoption of GAIT/TRIPs, see, e.g., Marshall
A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 303 (1991); Emery Simon, U.S. Trade Policy and
Intellectual Property Rights, 50 Alb. L. Rev. 501, 505-06 (1986); JacquesJ. Gorlin, GAIT:
A View from the United States, 5 Canadian Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 275 (1989);J.H. Reichman,
Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATr
Connection, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 747, 883-86 (1989); Liberalization of Services and
Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round of GATT (Giorgio Sacerdoti ed., 1990).
24. See Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2424.
25. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis(1), March
20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm onJuly 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1648, 828 U.N.T.S. 305,
337 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
26. Id., art. 10bis(2), 21 U.S.T. at 1648, 828 U.N.T.S. at 337.
27. G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property 144 (1968). The Guide enjoys a high degree of authority,
as it was written by the Director of the United International Bureau for the Protection of
Intellectual Property (BIRPI), the predecessor organization to World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), the entity charged with administering the Paris and Berne
Conventions.
As an example of international trade norms, the recent GATT/TRIPs accord
incorporates Paris Convention art. 10bis with respect to protection of trade secrets, and
defines "a manner contrary to honest commercial practices" as "at least practices such as
breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the
1994] 2563
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The treaty's failure to give content to these terms seriously weakens
article 10bis. Consider the unauthorized adaptation of a computer pro-
gram to a "hardware platform" for which it was not originally designed.
Reference to a given member country's law may yield different responses
as to whether the unauthorized transporting of the program would con-
stitute "competition."28 If it would not, then even if the conduct com-
plained of were "contrary to honest practices," the treaty apparently
would not apply. For example, assume that breaking into computer se-
curity codes or tapping into telephone connections violates international
norms of "honest practices."29 Assume also that, in the applicable forum,
using the information thus acquired to create a related, but not directly
competing program is not an act of "competition." In that case, the Paris
Convention may not require awarding relief.
Similarly, even if the forum would classify the challenged act as
"competition," if the act does not also violate international norms of
"honest practices," then article 10bis will not apply. Thus, if defendant
"clones" a user interface, but does so using publicly available information,
it is not clear that (in the absence of copyright protection) this act would
violate international standards of fair play. As a result, one must question
the ability of the Paris Convention to supply an alternative norm of intel-
lectual property protection for computer programs.
These pragmatic concerns about the timing of the Manifesto might
yield to a demonstration that, as a matter both of practice and of princi-
ple, a sui generis software protection regime would provide better, surer,
and more harmonious coverage for creativity in programming. In fact,
however, as Part II maintains, in the U.S. there is little security to be
gained from abandoning copyright in favor of unfair competition law.
Moreover, copyright protection of computer programs is not as discor-
dant as the Manifesto contends.
acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent
in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition." GATT/TRIPs,
supra note 4, art. 39.1, 39.2 n.10, 33 I.L.M. at 98.
28. Cf. Judgment of Feb. 12, 1989 (Veuve Clicquot-Ponsardin v. Franco Zari
Profumerie), Cass. LX 11 Diritto di Autore 419 (Italy) (since champagne and bubble bath
are directed at different markets, no unfair competition found when Italian producer of
bubble bath packaged his product in a bottle labelled with the champagne mark Veuve
Clicquot).
29. Cf.,Jean-Luc Crozafon, La question toujours en suspens du r gimejuridique des
6coutes t~l6phoniques [The Unresolved Status of the Legal Regime for Wire Tapping],
1989 Droit de l'informatique et des tl6coms 27, 30 (telephone tapping as a form of unfair
competition).
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II. CHOICE OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY REGIME: Too OPInMIsTIc ABoUT
ALTERNATIVES AND Too PESSIMImTC ABouT COPYIGHT
A. Too Optimistic
The bulk of the Manifesto addresses the perceived inadequacies or
inappropriateness of traditional forms of intellectual property law to reg-
ulate computer programs. The authors' treatment of alternatives is, how-
ever, regrettably scant. In essence, the authors propose to substitute
either a "registration system for innovative compilations of applied know-
how embodied in software,"3 0 or a misappropriation-based regime of un-
fair competition law.31 Neither alternative seems likely to succeed, at
least not imminently.
With respect to the registration alternative, so long as effective copy-
right or trade secret protections are available, software proprietors are
unlikely to be willing to trade them for a compulsory license registration
system. This is because the proposed registry, while affording compensa-
tion, denies the registrants any control over the use of their works. Col-
lective or compulsory licensing substitutes compensation for control
where there is no effective means to police unauthorized exploitation, or
where the transaction costs of negotiated licenses are too high.3 2 It is
therefore not a first resort3 3 The envisioned registry could have consid-
erable appeal as a voluntary adjunct to copyright protection (particularly
if its details were more developed than they are in the Manifesto), and
some software producers may well find it highly desirable some of the
time. But absent a genuine crisis in the traditional intellectual property
protection of computer programs, a generalized and exclusive registra-
tion/compulsory license system seems a remote possibility.
The Manifesto's proposal to substitute unfair competition law for
property-right based regimes ignores the persistent opposition by the
Supreme Court and other persuasive authority to the resurrection of
common-law misappropriation claims. For example, the American Law
Institute, in the recently issued Restatement of the Law of Unfalr Compe-
tition, has rejected the misappropriation doctrine, stressing that no liabil-
ity exists for the mere appropriation of "intangible trade values."3 4 The
30. Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2426.
31. See id. at 2423.
32. See, e.g., Robert Cassler, Copyright Compulsory Licenses-Are They Coming or
Going?, 37 J. Copyright Soc'y 231 (1990); Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines,
Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA
L. Rev. 1107, 1137-38 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Besen et al., supra note 17, at 76-85 (economists' critique of compulsory
licensing in copyright).
34. Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition § 38 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1993).
The drafters of the Restatement explained the purpose of Section 38 as follows:
Section 38 rejects a more general claim against misappropriation sometimes said
to, derive from International News Service v. Associated Press .... We conclude that
the Supreme Court's decision in the INS case has not been widely incorporated
into the common law of the states, that its force is limited by its unusual facts, and
19941 2565
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intellectual property decisions of the Supreme Court buttress the Restate-
ment. For example, in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats,3 5 the Court
ruled that a Florida "plug-molding" statute (providing, in effect, "and-
cloning" protection for boat hulls) was preempted by federal patent law.
The Court's rationale extends beyond federalism concerns, for the Court
stressed the general principle of free copying: "free exploitation of ideas
will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the excep-
tion .... [T]he federal patent laws must determine not only what is pro-
tected, but also what is free for all to use."36 In other words, if the innova-
tion is not protected by a formal property-right regime, then neither
federal nor state courts should entertain interstitial anti-copying claims.
Of course, Congress could enact a Federal Unfair Competition Act
pursuant to the Commerce Clause,3 7 but the content of such a law re-
quires careful consideration. Unfortunately, the Manifesto gives too little
attention to the detail of legislative approaches.
B. Too Pessimistic
The Manifesto's central criticism of copyright protection for com-
puter programs emphasizes that software "behaves," and that copyright
does not protect "behavior," particularly if the "behavior" is "func-
tional."38 There are at least two difficulties with this contention. First,
copyright in fact protects a wide variety of works that "behave." Second,
"functionality" is not a general bar to copyright protection. Traditionally,
copyright subsists in original works of authorship whatever the purpose of
the work,3 9 so long as a multitude of means of achieving the "purpose"
remain available. The problem is defining the "purpose" in a way that
promotes the creativity not only of the first-comer, but also of subsequent
authors in the same field.
that developments in the law of federal preemption limit its potential application.
Accordingly, we conclude that the decision should not be restated as a rule of
general applicability.
Id. § 38 Reporters' Memorandum (citation omitted).
35. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
36. Id. at 151 (1989); see also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33
(1964) (holding that the lower court erred in affording protection to an unpatented and
uncopyrighted pole lamp); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)
(rejecting state anticopying protection for unpatented lamp designs).
37. On Congress's power to enact noncopyright or nonpatent intellectual property
regimes, see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of
Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 367-87 (1992).
See also Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the
Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 471, 519-20 (1985).
38. See, e.g., Manifesto, supra note 1 at 2347-56.
39. Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works are an exception to this principle. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The Manifesto's authors have generalized the "useful article"
limitation on these works to copyrighted works as a whole. See infra notes 52-53.
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Copyrighted works that "behave" include architectural plans, 40 chor-
eography,41 musical scores,42 musical editions,4
3 and stage direction.44
All these works set forth ways of achieving "a certain result."45 Moreover,
these works share the duality of "text" and "behavior" described by the
Manifesto.46 For example, the "text" of a musical score or of a choreo-
graphic work exists to be executed; the notations have value primarily as
instructions to the performance of the musical or choreographic task. As
with computer programs, the particular form of the "instructions" does
not define the work: if a choreographic work is initially expressed in
Laban notation, it is no excuse to an infringement charge that defen-
dant's copy was rendered in Benesh notation. The "work" is the collec-
tion of dance movements, not the particular language in which the move-
ment is expressed. By the same token, the code in which a computer
program is written sets forth, but does not necessarily constitute, the
copyrighted work.
One might object that this discussion has so far concerned aesthetic
works, while computer programs are "functional." But copyright also
protects architectural plans, even though these set forth instructions to
construct a "functional" object, a building. Moreover, since the 1990 Ar-
chitectural Works Copyright Protection Act,4 7 it is clear that architectural
plans are infringed not only by copying in the initial format, but also by
following the plans to execute the building,48 so long as the building's
function does not compel its form.
49
In general, apart from the specific category of "pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works," U.S. copyright law does not distinguish between "aes-
thetic" and "functional" works. Congress has attempted to divide the use-
ful from the beautiful with respect to artworks by requiring that artistic
elements of "useful articles" be separable from the article's utilitarian as-
pects.5 0 However, the artworks regime is both anomalous and largely un-
40. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
41. See id. § 102(a) (4).
42. See id. § 102(a) (2).
43. See id. §§ 101, 103, which protects derivative works. Editions are considered
"derivative works." See, e.g., 1 Paul Goldstein, Copyright Principles, Law and Practice
§ 1.6.2, at 32 (1989).
44. See Jessica Litman, Copyright in the Stage Direction of a Broadway Musical, 7
Colum.-VI[AJ.L. & Arts 309, 312-18 (1983).
45. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of a computer program).
46. See Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2316.
47. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VII, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
48. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 19 (1990);Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary of the Visual Artists Rights Act and the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 477,
492-93 & n.61 (1990). The building itself must satisfy minimum standards of originality,
see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of an "architectural work").
49. See H.R. Rep. No. 735, supra note 48, at 20-21.




satisfactory in application. 51 It would be both inaccurate and unfortunate
to extrapolate from the peculiar regulation of applied art a rule of gen-
eral applicability to "useful" works of authorship.52 No general copyright
doctrine of "applied literature"
53 exists. 54
Instead, copyright law in general addresses the kind of concerns that
underlie the applied art limitation-fear of monopolization of inappropri-
ate subject matter-through the long-established idea-expression dichot-
omy and idea-expression merger doctrines. The copyright statute, adopt-
ing a long case-law tradition,55 codifies the idea-expression dichotomy as
follows: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration... regardless of the form in which it is... embodied in such
work."56 In other words, while the overall presentation of a work expos-
ing ideas or describing a process is protected, the ideas disclosed or
processes revealed are not. The merger doctrine, as applied in myriad
judicial decisions, denies copyright protection to those expressions of
ideas that permit too few variations, lest by protecting the expression
copyright also privatize the idea.57 Hence, it is not surprising that in
many of the computer software litigations, courts have rejected merger
51. See, e.g., Shim Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs
of Useful Articles, 37J. Copyright Soc'y 339 (1990) (detailed discussion of the case law).
52. See Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2352, in which the authors evoke the pictorial-
graphic-sculptural work "useful article" doctrine, and recommend its extension to
distinguishing functional from expressive behaviors.
However, the extension is imperfect, since the statute excludes from the realm of
"useful articles" works "having an intrinsic utilitarian function ... merely to... convey
information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). And the Manifesto authors undercut the useful
article analogy with their own earlier characterization of computer programs as
information products constructed from information components. See Manifesto, supra
note 1, at 2335-36, 2367.
53. The term comes from the work of Professor Jerome Reichman, who has long
argued for an extension of the applied art regime to utilitarian literature. See, e.g.,Jerome
H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of
Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 639
(1989).
54. See also Dam, supra note 17, at 3-7 (rejecting functionality objection to copyright
protection for software, and concluding that "the usefulness of software is an argument for,
rather than against, copyright protection for software.").
55. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (rejecting attempt to invoke
copyright protection of accounting forms in order to prevent unauthorized use of the
bookkeeping system).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
57. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971) (arrangement ofjewels on bee-shaped pins); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (soapbox sweepstakes contest rules); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958)
(insurance forms). Moreover, the "merger" doctrine applies to all works, whether useful
or frivolous. The idea-expression dichotomy is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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defenses when a plaintiff shows that unrelated competitors are exploiting
functionally similar programs that were not copied from the plaintiff's. 58
However, evocation of the idea-expression dichotomy and merger
doctrines does not resolve the problem, without also elucidating what
constitutes an unprotectable idea, and what comprises protectable ex-
pression. This is one of the hardest tasks in traditional copyright analy-
sis.59 It remains difficult, but not necessarily more so, when computer
programs are at issue.
Congress has supplied two arguably inconsistent directives pertinent
to computer programs. First, for all works of authorship, Congress in the
1976 Copyright Act declared that protection does not "extend to... pro-
cess[es]." 60 Second, in 1980, Congress enacted amendments to the 1976
Act, to make clear that computer programs are protected by copyright
law. Congress then defined a "computer program" as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result."61 There may be some tension between
58. See, e.g., Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335,
1344-45 (5th Cir. 1994) (rival offihore oil platform engineering programs); Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238-39 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (rival dental lab management programs); Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65-66 (D. Mass. 1990) (rival spreadsheet
programs). By contrast, in Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv.,
Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1987) no evidence was submitted of rival cotton
market programs that had not been copied from the plaintiff's; the Court found a merger
of the program's idea and the expression of the program's nonliteral structure. In this
respect, one might observe that the courts' analyses have been "market oriented." Cf.
Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2365-66 (proposing a market oriented approach to protect
against "trivial acquisitions of equivalence [that would have] market destructive effects").
59. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960) (L. Hand, J.) ("[N]o principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc."). For academic commentary on the idea-expression dichotomy, see,
e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity- The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 Ind. LJ. 175 (1990)
(noting that the line between idea and expression is often a product ofjudge's subjective
views of art); Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47
U. Miami L. Rev. 1221 (1993) (seeking to identify traits of an unprotectable idea); Edward
Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 321 (1989)
(surveying history of doctrine and noting its marginal utility). For academic commentary
on the idea-expression dichotomy as applied to computer programs, see, e.g., John W.L.
Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer Program Parts Under Learned Hand's Abstractions Test
in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 526 (1992); Peter G. Spivack,
Comment, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 723 (1988); Timothy S. Teter, Note,
Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibility Trend in Computer
Software Copyright Cases, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1061 (1993) (arguing that copying to achieve
compatibility among software products should be allowed under the merger doctrine).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The definition was added by the Act of December 12,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,94 Stat. 3015, 3082. In enacting thd 1980 amendments, Congress
adopted, virtually verbatim, the recommendations of the Commission on New
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these two texts: a "set of instructions used in order to bring about a cer-
tain result" would appear, at least in lay terms, to constitute a "process,"
"system," or "method of operation." Since one should endeavor to con-
strue statutes in a way that does not render them futile,62 and since we
know that Congress did determine in 1980 to protect computer pro-
grams, 63 the terms "process," "system," or "method of operation" must
not be understood literally. As a result, some ways of achieving "a certain
result" (i.e., some "behaviors") will be protected by copyright.64 What
ways, and what results?
The tried-and-true (but nonetheless maddeningly elusive) "abstrac-
tions test" determines the "result" whose achievement may be protected,
so long as there are a sufficient variety of alternative ways to that end.
The debate, which cuts across classes of copyrighted works, focuses on the
level of specificity or generality at which the "result" (or idea) is de-
fined.65 The more specific the idea, the more likely the merger doctrine
is to disqualify plaintiff's work; the more broadly defined the idea, the
more likely plaintiff's rendition will survive scrutiny, and the broader the
scope of plaintiff's potential protection as well. 66 In effect, the merger
Technological Uses that it had appointed to study the copyrightability of computer
programs.
62. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940) (declining to adopt a reading of statutory language that would lead to "absurd or
futile results... 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.'" (quoting
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922))); EEOC v. Commercial Office Products
Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1988) (same).
63. See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases
and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977,
982-85 (1993).
64. Moreover, as we have seen, some nonsoftware works of authorship are protected
even though they constitute "processes" or "methods of operation" in the colloquial sense.
For example, an edition of a musical score instructs the performer as to how to execute the
composition, including where and with what force to place the fingers and where to
breathe. See, e.g., Artur Schnabel, Editor's Preface to Beethoven: Complete Piano
Sonatas, 4 (Artur Schnabel ed., 1977).
65. With respect to copyrighted works generally, see, e.g., Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537,
1540-42 (7th Cir. 1990) (television program incorporating historical analysis developed in
nonfiction book held not to infringe book's expression). With respect to computer
programs, for example, Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), has been widely criticized for having defined the
"idea" or "function, of the program too broadly. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karala, Copyright,
Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28JurimetricsJ. 33, 76-80 (1987); Peter
S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41
Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1082-83 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp. 203, 211 (D. Mass. 1992)
(setting forth a sliding scale of characterizations of the "idea" of plaintiff's user interface).
Consider the following example: Plaintiff's work is a play in which the villain ties the
heroine down to the train tracks;just as the onrushing train is about to reach the intended
victim, the hero arrives and, struggling with the ropes, releases her at the last second.
Today a clich6, this scene was once a theatrical innovation, and was the subject of a
successful copyright infringement suit. See Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1868) (No. 3552). Suppose the defendant, having learned that literal copying of the scene
2570 [Vol. 94:2559
MANIFET SUPERIOR=TY OF COPYRIGHT 2571
concept has no content independent of the articulation of the idea. And
the definition of the idea ultimately must be informed by public policy
notions of free, and fair, competition. Whether or not the court acknowl-
edges its inquiry, judges in copyright cases are attempting to gauge what
level of protection is necessary to encourage initial creation on the one
hand, while seeking to leave ample room for subsequent innovation on
the other.67 Congress set a pro-protection policy when it enacted the
1980 computer software amendments, but the scope of that protection
remains subject to debate. 68 As the case law evolves, many of the "market-
oriented" concerns that inform the Manifesto may well be incorporated
into the courts' copyright analyses. 69
will be reprimanded, adopts a variation, in which the villain confines the hero to a box,
which she buries in a rat-filled pit; the rats will eat through the box, and then will consume
the hero. As the last shards of box are about to be devoured, the heroine appears, armed
with rat repellent, and frees the hero. Has defendant copied the "expression" or merely
the "idea" of the scene?
1. If the "idea" is characterized as "villain ties up heroine; hero frees her from
oncoming train," then plaintiff's rendition may well be deemed to "merge" with the
idea. At most, the range of protectable "expression" will be limited to plaintiff's
precise exposition of the scene.
2. If the "idea" is characterized as "villain attaches heroine; hero saves her from
onrushing vehicle," then not only would plaintiff's precise rendition be protectable,
but the scope of protection could also extend to enacting the scene with a variety of
different trains and bonds. There are sufficient alternative vehicles and means of
attaching the intended victim to tolerate the extension of the concept of plaintiff's
'expression" to close nonliteral similarity.
3. If the "idea" is characterized as "forces of evil confine and place agent of good in
imminent danger of grisly demise, but another agent of good frees the prisoner in the
nick of time," then not only is plaintiff's work an "expression" of that "idea," but the
scope of plaintiff's copyright might now extend to any kind of vehicle, as well as to a
myriad of means of attaching the intended victim. A vast variety of extra-vehicular
dangers may menace imminent grisly demises; and attaching the victim with rope, or
with chains, or with other bonds are but some of many ways to imprison. In this case,
the range of nonliteral "expression" broadens even more.
4. If the "idea" is characterized as "forces of evil threaten forces of good, but good
prevails," then the scope of plaintiff's copyright might extend to any kind of threat of
imminent grisly demise accompanied by any kind of imprisonment and last minute
salvation. In that case (and on this series of examples, only in that case), defendant's
version would be found to infringe. Given the breadth of the idea, there remains a
large range of alternative expositions of the general theme; the sequence of imminent
grisly death-imprisonment-sudden freedom is by no means the only way (or even
one of few ways) to convey the triumph of good over enterprising evil.
67. Judge Easterbrook has clearly and candidly articulated the task, and its difficulties.
See Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540; see also Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 346 & nn.37-38,
(exploring the boundaries of copyright protection with respect to ideas).
68. Compare Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)
(suggesting Congress was wrong to have brought computer programs within copyright law)
with Lotus Dev. Corp., 799 F. Supp. at 203 (it is not for courts to second-guess Congress's
choice to protect computer programs by copyright law).
69. Cf. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (adopting analysis of court-appointed expert witness-one of
the authors of the Manifesto).
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CONCLUSION
A well-known ungrammatical adage warns against repairing that
which, even if imperfect, nonetheless works reasonably well. That coun-
sel should apply here: the evolving case law suggests that U.S. courts are
successfully, if in some cases somewhat skeptically, applying copyright
analysis to computer programs. Courts, agencies, and legislatures the
world over have now undertaken, through their GATT obligations, to
provide copyright protection to computer programs. Also, it is not at all
clear that a noncopyright "fix" to the system of software protection is
available, or desirable, at least as a matter of U.S. law. Finally, the Mani-
festo's assessment of copyright law's ability to protect, and promote, com-
puter program innovation is too begrudging. Copyright is more flexible
and resilient than the Manifesto acknowledges: copyright law can manifest
the "market-oriented" sensitivity with which the Manifesto seeks to imbue
a sui generis software protection regime.
